Abstract: The Place of Structural Arguments in Contemporary Constitutional Theory
Kenneth Ward
This essay illustrates how our interest in questions of constitutional doctrine
makes it difficult to assess structural arguments about judicial authority. In the past forty
years, we have witnessed a shift in American constitutional theory. Scholars once
assessed judicial authority based on their expectations of how judges should decide cases.
In time, many concluded that discretion is an inevitable consequence of constitutional
interpretation and therefore sought to justify such authority.
This shift has led some scholars to give greater emphasis to structural arguments.
They identify institutional virtues that explain the judiciary’s role in a well ordered
government. Although these scholars are less concerned than their predecessors with
how judges should interpret the Constitution, many retain the doctrinal focus of the
earlier generation. This essay identifies problems that follow from this focus.
Section I traces the evolution in Ronald Dworkin’s approach to questions of
judicial authority. Dworkin’s work provides a notable example of how doctrinal claims
become entangled with structural arguments and confuse our assessment of judicial
authority. Section II contrasts Dworkin with scholars who have made claims in which
the doctrinal and structural aspects are more readily distinguished. Section III examines
the First Things Symposium, in which prominent conservative scholars attack the kind of
judicial activism that Dworkin justifies. But the Symposiasts assess judicial authority
from the same doctrinal perspective as Dworkin and provide a vivid illustration of how
doctrinal controversies obscure structural arguments. Section IV concludes the essay by
examining implications this analysis has for debates in constitutional theory.
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The Place of Structural Arguments in Contemporary Constitutional Theory
Kenneth Ward*
American constitutional theory encompasses at least three overlapping debates.
First, scholars argue about what the Constitution means. They consider different theories
of constitutional interpretation, theories that identify the values we seek to advance
through the Constitution. These include the substantive values expressed in particular
provisions, such as the First Amendment’s commitments to freedom of expression and
religion, as well as structural values that are reflected in the design of the Constitution
itself, such as commitments to checking power, democratic elections and privacy.
Second, scholars argue about who has authority to say what the Constitution
means, whether it be judges or elected officials or some combination of the two. This
debate interlocks with the first. On the one hand, the question of who has authority to
interpret the Constitution is itself a question of constitutional interpretation. On the other
hand, our answer would to some extent depend on the institutional structure we thought
best suited for interpreting the Constitution.
Finally, scholars argue about the values, both substantive and structural, that we
should advance through constitutional law. This debate considers the Constitution from
an external perspective. It overlaps with the other two in that scholars identify values that
might be advanced through our interpretation of the Constitution. But the reasons to
support these values do not follow from an understanding of the Constitution itself, and
unlike the other debates, this one is not about how to interpret the Constitution. Indeed, it
might indicate reforms necessary to strengthen our system of constitutional government.
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The third debate includes structural claims that have become increasingly
important in constitutional theory. They are different from the more familiar class of
structural claims that speak to the values we should advance when we interpret
Constitution.1 These claims, by contrast, identify vices and virtues of different
institutional arrangements.2 They examine the consequences that follow from the way
judicial and elected institutions go about resolving controversies. It is easy to
underestimate the significance of these claims, however, because they are far removed
from the questions of constitutional interpretation that are central to the other debates.
This essay contends that constitutional theorists have tended to focus on those debates
and thus have had difficulty identifying and assessing these structural claims.
The essay first examines the evolution in Ronald Dworkin’s approach to
questions of judicial authority. Dworkin’s work exemplifies a shift in constitutional
theory in which scholars give greater emphasis to structural claims. It also illustrates
how easily these claims can become entangled with doctrinal arguments and thereby
confuse our assessment of judicial authority.
The essay then turns to the First Things Symposium, which was subsequently
published as The End of Democracy?3 The Symposium addresses a wide range of issues
relating to how citizens should respond to Supreme Court decisions they believe outside
of the Court’s legitimate authority. In developing a strategy to overturn these holdings,
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the Symposiasts attack the kind of judicial activism that Dworkin justifies and, in the
process, make claims concerning the appropriate scope of judicial power. Nonetheless,
the Symposiasts assess judicial authority from the same doctrinal perspective as Dworkin
and provide a particularly vivid illustration of how doctrinal controversies obscure
structural arguments.
The Symposiasts suggest an important structural claim against expansive judicial
authority: that a Court empowered with judicial review will promote instability, because
the exercise of judicial review tends to inflame political conflict. Judicial decisions
sometimes create unfair presumptions in favor of disputed conceptions of constitutional
values. These presumptions make it harder for citizens to advance opposing
interpretations of the Constitution, even though disagreements about what the
Constitution means remain political issues. Therefore, rather than helping the political
community get past particularly divisive social controversies, judicial decisions lead
people to pursue their disagreements with greater intensity. This claim, however, is not
developed and lost in the glare of the Symposiasts’ doctrinal arguments.
What is more, the Symposium illustrates how a concern to advance a conception
of constitutional doctrine makes it easy to ignore structural arguments pertaining to the
interests of actual litigants. The Judiciary’s role in deciding particular cases is in tension
with its role in resolving our disagreements about what the Constitution means. By
focusing on how judges should resolve these disagreements, we risk ignoring the
difficulties that an uncertain law imposes on those whose lives depend on how judges
decide these cases. A judge who decides cases with an eye toward advancing a
conception of constitutional law will disregard the interests of litigants whose legitimate
claims interfere with that goal.
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Section I illustrates how Dworkin assesses judicial authority in light of his
understanding of what constitutional doctrine should be. Section II contends that
Dworkin’s doctrinal orientation informs different claims he makes about judicial
authority. These include a structural claim that has doctrinal implications, and these
implications make it impossible to disentangle the structural and doctrinal aspects of the
claim. Although Dworkin’s claims are typical of many arguments in constitutional
theory, we will see that some scholars have made structural claims in which the doctrinal
and structural aspects are more readily distinguished. Section III uses the Symposiasts’
disagreement with Dworkin to explain why scholars with a doctrinal orientation are less
likely to give adequate consideration to such structural claims. It contends that: (1) these
scholars often use structural claims to advance a doctrinal agenda and consequently do
not consider structural claims as having independent weight; (2) this problem is
exacerbated because structural claims often have doctrinal aspects, and scholars with a
doctrinal orientation are likely to focus on these aspects; and (3) scholars with this
orientation tend to see the Court’s role in resolving particular cases as only a component
of its role in the process that identifies constitutional values. They do not consider that
the Court’s performance of one role might undercut its performance of the other and thus
ignore structural claims that pertain to the former role. Section IV concludes the essay by
examining implications this analysis has for debates in constitutional theory, in particular
for the question of the appropriate extent of judicial authority.
I. Dworkin and Justification: Justice, Doctrine and Judicial Authority
This section examines Dworkin’s justification of expansive judicial authority. He
believes such authority increases the likelihood that constitutional doctrine will satisfy
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norms of justice. Much of Dworkin’s work flows from the notion that people ought to be
treated with equal concern and respect.4 This understanding underlies the attack on legal
positivism that made his early reputation5 and also the alternative conception of law that
he defends, what Dworkin calls law as integrity.6 It leads Dworkin to assess political
institutions based on the respect people are owed as individuals and thus explains why he
focuses on the particular decisions political institutions should make. His work in
constitutional theory extends this doctrinal orientation: he defends judicial review
because he expects that judges will make better decisions than legislators regarding the
conditions necessary to secure equal status for citizens.7
Consider first how the idea of equal concern and respect informs his attack on
legal positivism and his association of law with the virtue of integrity. While positivists
sought to distinguish law and morality by showing that we could conceptualize law
without making any claims about morality, Dworkin sought to establish that morality was
integral to law, because we advance a conception of fairness when we resolve social
controversies based on pre-established standards.8 Law, according to Dworkin, justifies
and limits the state’s use of coercion by making its use contingent on—and consistent
with—past political decisions that define people’s rights and responsibilities.9
Dworkin believes that by separating law and morality the positivists cannot address
adequately an important jurisprudential problem, namely people’s obligation to obey
judge made law.10 He explains our obligation to obey judicial decisions in “hard cases,”
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cases in which existing legal sources provide no clear standard to ground a decision.11
Dworkin contends that judicial decisions should extend and clarify the principles of
justice manifest in the political community’s past practices. Such decisions treat citizens
with the concern and respect necessary to make their compliance obligatory.12
The notion that we use law to justify the exercise of political authority also
underlies Dworkin’s conception of law as integrity.13 He defends law as integrity as an
account of judicial practice. He contends that it fits our understanding of what judges do
and that it presents the practice in its best light.14

Dworkin believes that a state

strengthens its claim to legitimacy when judicial decisions exhibit the virtue of integrity.
Integrity “. . . requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and
coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone the substantive standards of
justice or fairness it uses for some.”15 Dworkin claims that by applying its principles
with integrity, a community exhibits mutual concern, what he considers the hallmark of a
community in which citizens have an obligation to obey political authority.16
Dworkin contrasts this conception of law with rivals that fail to generate mutual
concern, because they either ignore past decisions or are bound too rigidly to them.17 His
defense of integrity, thus, extends the doctrinal focus of his earlier work.

Indeed,

Dworkin dedicates nearly a third of Law’s Empire to illustrations of how judges should
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interpret legal principles to advance integrity and promote the conditions necessary to
sustain their authority.18
In Freedom’s Law, Dworkin builds from the argument in Law’s Empire to defend
an expansive conception of judicial authority. He contends that judicial review can be
justified as consistent with norms of democratic government, if it increases the likelihood
that a political community would treat citizens with equal concern and respect.19 It
would do so by securing for citizens genuine membership in the political community.20
This notion of genuine membership connects Dworkin’s justification of judicial review to
his conception of law as integrity. Judicial authority is justified if judges reach decisions
that promote integrity.
Judicial decisions, according to this view, should reflect the best interpretation of
the political community’s principles of justice, and judges should extend these principles
to all applicable contexts.21 It is not surprising, therefore, that he again spends
considerable time describing how judges should decide cases. He presents Freedom’s
Law as an exercise in interpreting principles of American constitutional law in light of
the virtue of integrity.22
Throughout his career, Dworkin’s belief that citizens should be treated with equal
concern and respect leads him to focus on constitutional doctrine. We can identify at
18
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least three distinct claims that assess judicial authority based on whether judicial
decisions advance equality. To sharpen the distinction, we frame the claims in terms of
23
Brown v. Board of Education of Education , a case that Dworkin believes integral to an

account of American judicial authority.24
(1) The decision in Brown v. Board is legitimate, because it advanced the
Constitution’s conception of equality by interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment as forbidding school segregation.
(2) The decision in Brown v. Board illustrates how the Judiciary as an
institution contributes to American government by promoting
integrity. The Court ensured equal concern and respect for African
American citizens by extending an important principle of American
government, equality, to a context in which it was applicable.
(3) The decision in Brown v. Board suggests that an institutional structure
that includes judicial review by an independent Court increases the
likelihood that political institutions will exhibit the virtue of integrity
and promote the equality among citizens suggested thereby.
Moreover, we can identify a fourth claim, one that Dworkin would reject, that would
circumscribe judicial authority notwithstanding the decision in Brown.

This claim

assesses judicial authority in light of an understanding of equality that has no bearing on
how judges should decide cases.
(4) The decision in Brown v. Board advanced a compelling conception of
equality. But the judicial process itself cannot be characterized as
equal, especially in comparison to the legislative process. The judicial
process limits the number of people who have a say about a political
outcome and the arguments that receive a hearing before a final
decision is made as to that outcome.
The next section uses these claims to consider Dworkin’s relationship with American
constitutional theory. It illustrates how debates in constitutional theory have tended to
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share Dworkin’s doctrinal focus.

The following section then identifies negative

consequences that follow from this focus.
II. The Doctrinal Orientation of American Constitutional Theory
Dworkin belongs to a generation of American legal scholars who came to
maturity during the ascendance of the Warren Court. Many of these scholars sought to
reconcile the Court’s activism on behalf of individual rights with the preceding
generation’s commitment to legislation as the primary vehicle for social progress.25
Indeed, Dworkin frames his defense of expansive judicial authority as a response to his
mentor Learned Hand, a giant of the earlier generation whose Holmes Lecture criticizing
Brown is an important statement of that generations’ skepticism about such activism.26
Dworkin clerked for Hand and helped prepare that lecture.27 He responds to Hand forty
years later. But it seems that the earlier foray into the controversy surrounding Brown
would help explain the doctrinal orientation that permeates so much of his work.
Constitutional theorists of Dworkin’s generation share this orientation. To a
significant extent, debates in constitutional theory have been animated by the need to
defend Brown v. Board.28 Alexander Bickel, for example, framed The Least Dangerous
Branch as a response to Hand and Herbert Wechsler29—who also used the occasion of a
Holmes Lecture to question Brown.30 Bickel introduces the term counter-majoritarian
difficulty to describe the problem of justifying judicial review, why a non-elected
judiciary should have authority to invalidate actions of elected institutions of
25
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government.31 The counter-majoritarian difficulty became the touchstone for two
generations of constitutional theorists, and they tended to view the problem as one of
establishing the democratic legitimacy of Brown and other controversial Supreme Court
decisions.32
In their quest to solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty, constitutional theorists
have often made claims similar to those we associated with Dworkin. Theorists
originally sought to identify principles that could constrain judicial discretion, and
consequently their work shares the doctrinal focus that characterized Dworkin’s criticism
of positivist understandings of law and his defense of law as integrity. This focus is
captured by claims (1) and (2). In time, theorists moved beyond the counter-majoritarian
difficulty and sought to justify the discretion that judges exercised. In so doing, their
arguments parallel Dworkin’s appeal to the virtue of integrity to justify an expansive
conception of judicial authority, claim (3). After examining Dworkin’s claims, we will
identify analogs that have emerged in American constitutional theory.

A. Constitutional Values versus Institutional Virtues
The first two claims focus on how judges should decide cases.
(1) The decision in Brown v. Board is legitimate, because it advanced the
Constitution’s conception of equality by interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment as forbidding school segregation.
(2) The decision in Brown v. Board illustrates how the Judiciary as an
institution contributes to American government by promoting
integrity. The Court ensured equal concern and respect for African
30
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American citizens by extending an important principle of American
government, equality, to a context in which it was applicable.
Both (1) and (2) appeal to equality as a value that judges should seek to advance
as they formulate constitutional doctrine. I refer to such values as constitutional values.
(1) reflects Dworkin’s notion that legal decisions are authoritative when they treat people
with equal concern and respect. And, in this particular case, plaintiffs won a case they
had a right to win based on the principle of equality defined by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.33 The Court, according to Dworkin, would have
undercut its authority, if it had allowed segregation to continue in violation of this right.34
(2) also addresses the Court’s exercise of authority, though it appeals to a more
abstract understanding of equality than does (1). More significantly, (2) adds a new
dimension: it considers whether this particular outcome is consistent with the Court’s
other decisions about equality. This second dimension is also a claim about equality. It
reflects Dworkin’s contention that judges derive authority because they promote equal
concern and respect for citizens by extending constitutional principles to all applicable
cases. (2), in contrast to (1), appeals to a value that is not the immediate subject of
adjudication. This second dimension of equality is also captured in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s commitment to equal protection.35 But analogs of (2) need not be and
usually are not given explicit constitutional expression.
Nonetheless, (2) is like (1) in that judicial authority seems to depend on how
judges decide particular cases. This is why I characterize both claims as appealing to
constitutional values. (3) and (4), by contrast, appeal to equality as an institutional virtue.
33
34
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(3) The decision in Brown v. Board suggests that an institutional structure
that includes judicial review by an independent Court increases the
likelihood that political institutions will exhibit the virtue of integrity
and promote the equality among citizens suggested thereby.
(4) The decision in Brown v. Board advanced a compelling conception of
equality. But the judicial process itself cannot be characterized as
equal, especially in comparison to the legislative process. The judicial
process limits the number of people who have a say about a political
decision and the arguments that receive a hearing before that decision
is made.
(3) is similar to (2) in that it considers judicial authority based on a higher order norm—it
asks whether the Court increases the likelihood that our system of constitutional
government will exhibit the virtue of integrity. But we should answer this question
without reference to how well judges interpret the Constitution in any particular case.
(3) is a structural claim: it emphasizes institutional features of the Judiciary that make it
more likely to advance integrity than a system that does not subject its legislature to as
robust a judicial check.
Nonetheless, (3) has a doctrinal aspect as well. We must look at judicial decisions
to test whether a Judiciary with the authority of judicial review increases the chances that
our principles of government will be applied with integrity. Dworkin makes this clear
when he states that “[T]he best institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce
the best answers to the essentially moral question of what the democratic conditions
actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those conditions.”36 And we would
reject (3), if we found that judicial decisions did not exhibit the integrity Dworkin
believes underlies the Judiciary’s contribution to such a structure.37
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On the other hand, (3) does not require any particular adjudicative outcome. We
need not consider whether judges interpreted the Constitution correctly, whether they
advanced the proper substantive understanding of equality or an understanding that is
consistent with a higher order value. Instead, we must determine whether the universe of
judicial decisions increase the likelihood that our political institutions exhibit integrity.
Our discussion of American constitutional theory will identify claims like (3) that
are more removed from questions of constitutional doctrine. While it is impossible to
divorce Dworkin’s claim from an understanding of how judges should decide cases,
other scholars associate judicial authority with virtues that depend more on how judges
go about making decisions than on the particular decisions they make. We will see that
these theories fall on a continuum ranging from claims like Dworkin’s, claims in which it
is difficult to separate their structural and doctrinal aspects, to those more similar to (4), a
claim that is completely divorced from considerations of constitutional doctrine. More
significantly, Section III will illustrate how our concern for constitutional doctrine can
obscure the structural aspects of claims like (3).
While (4) stands out as a criticism of judicial review, we consider it in order to
highlight the structural aspects of claims like (3). Both (3) and (4) assess the Court’s
authority in light of structural features of the judicial process, and consequently they do
not depend on how judges decide particular cases. But claims like (3) make assumptions
about how judges actually go about deciding cases in a way that is not true of (4), which
assigns no weight to the outcome of adjudications or even to the manner in which cases
are adjudicated. Indeed, (4)’s claim that adjudication systematically excludes people and
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15
interests from the process of decision-making would survive, even if we were to think
that the Judiciary would always decide cases correctly. Jeremy Waldron employs a claim
like (4) to argue against judicial review.38 But we will see that scholars also defend
judicial review based on considerations that are divorced from the cases judges must
resolve.
This introduces a final consideration. Although theorists can appeal to claims of
each of these types when assessing judicial authority, the claims cannot always be
weighed against each other. The notion of equality advanced when we make decisions
through particular procedures is different than the notion of equality we use to assess the
decisions that are made. And while it seems likely if not obvious that sometimes it is
more important to get a decision right than it is to go about the decision in the right way,
it is not clear when this is the case.

B. The Shift from Constitutional Values to Institutional Virtues in Constitutional Theory
We also see analogs of each of these claims in constitutional theory. After
Brown, many theorists sought to solve the conventional view of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty.39 The conventional view assumes that judicial review undercuts two bases of
democratic legitimacy. Elected institutions: (a) define values that better reflect the will of
citizens, and (b) allow citizens to control their government. Constitutional theorists, then,
must ground judicial authority in values that can overcome these concerns. Judges,
according to this view, derive authority when they interpret legal principles in a manner
38
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that advances values that the community endorses or should endorse and that at the same
time limit judicial discretion. It is thought that such principles subject judges to
something like democratic control.
These theories resemble Dworkin’s in that judicial authority seems to follow
when judges interpret constitutional principles correctly, and thus, judges must enforce
the right values in order to sustain their authority. It is this doctrinal focus that explains
why the debate surrounding the counter-majoritarian difficulty originally gravitated
toward claims like (1) and (2).
Consider John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust.40 Ely criticizes various
attempts to solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty and then joins the quest by offering
his own solution. Ely rejects non-originalist—what he calls non-interpretivist41--theories
of judicial review. These theories assign judges a lawmaking function, the power to
enforce values not found in the text of the Constitution.42 His criticisms suggest a
pattern. Theorists make a claim like (3), that the judiciary has the independence,
expertise or other structural feature necessary to advance values that elected institutions
are ill suited to respect, and then claim judicial decisions might advance or actually have
advanced these values, a claim analogous to (1) or (2).
The weight of their arguments fall on the doctrinal claim, as Ely illustrates when
he shows that non-originalists do not identify an acceptable source of values that will
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limit judicial discretion.43 Ely also defends judicial review. He contends that judges
should enforce certain core procedural principles that define American democracy, and
that these principles will limit judicial discretion.44 But Ely’s critics note that his
structural claim masks a series of doctrinal claims; Ely's approach does not in fact limit
judicial discretion, because judges' concern for the outcome of cases will inevitably
determine which values they try to advance.45
More significantly, Ely's work stoked two powerful trends in constitutional
theory, both of which focus on limiting judicial discretion and thus assess judicial
authority based on claims like (1) and (2). First, theorists associated with the revival of
civic republicanism extend Ely's idea that judges should enforce principles that define the
operation of American democracy. They argue that judges can discover these principles
within the wider social context in which citizens debate and define the political
community’s values.46 The second trend is the rise of originalism. Originalists contend
that judicial review is only legitimate if judges enforce principles they derive from the
ordinary meaning of the Constitution.47
Both originalists and civic republicans, however, fail to identify principles that
limit judicial discretion to the extent necessary to resolve the counter-majoritarian
difficulty. As evidence of an unconstrained judiciary has mounted, many theorists have
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sought to move beyond the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Some theorists continue to
make claims like (1) and (2) and reject judicial review based on the values they expect
judges to advance. Consider the surprising convergence in the work of Mark Tushnet
and Robert Bork–theorists who are on opposite sides of the political spectrum and who
have been associated with republicanism and originalism, respectively.48 Both conclude
that legal principles are too indeterminate to limit judicial discretion. And each has
argued that judicial review should be significantly curtailed, because judges will not
advance good values.49
Other theorists take a different tact. They give greater emphasis to the process
that expresses the community’s values and less to the particular values that legal
decisions might advance. In other words, they attempt to justify the discretion that judges
exercise, rather than identify principles that would constrain such discretion. They claim
that political legitimacy attaches to the broader political process that expresses values,
and that judges derive authority by contributing to a good process. In so doing, they
make claims like (3) to assert virtue in a constitutional structure that includes judicial
review.
We have recently been deluged by such arguments; theorists claim that judicial
review makes the political process more deliberative, representative, just, free or that it
advances some other important goal.50 Republicans, for example, now emphasize the
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role judges play within the political system, rather than the values that judges should
advance. Bruce Ackerman and Cass Sunstein contend that judicial review is consistent
with democratic government when that idea is properly understood, and explain how
judges might contribute to deliberation about constitutional values.51
Originalists have also veered from the view that judges legitimate their power by
enforcing legal principles that constrain their discretion. Instead, they give greater
emphasis to how originalist interpretation follows from the institutional design of the
Constitution. Keith Whittington has argued that judicial review contributes to a system
of government that makes self-government possible.52 He argues that judges undermine
this system when they enforce constitutional principles that do not reflect the
Constitution's original meaning.53 His approach is emblematic of theorists who tether
originalist interpretation to considerations of why the political community governs itself
through a written constitution.54
These claims appeal to virtues that characterize governments with judicial review
as opposed to the particular values that judges are likely to advance through their
interpretations of constitutional principle. Steven Macedo, for example, contends that the
judiciary, as an institution, respects citizens as reasonable beings, because judges must

THE SUPREME COURT (1999); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION
(2001); Gerald F. Gaus, Public Reason and the Rule of Law, in NOMOS: THE RULE OF LAW 328 (Ian
Shapiro ed., 1994)
51
See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE--FOUNDATIONS (1991); CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIM: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
52
See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
53
Id. at 111.
54
See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism; (defending originalism as advancing the value of
constancy and thus promoting order); Michael J. Perry, What is "the Constitution"? (and Other
Fundamental Questions), (defending originalism as necessary to advance the Constitution's aim of
coordinating social interaction); Jed Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, in Constitutionalism:
Philosophical Foundations (linking originalist interpretation to the value of freedom) all in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (Larry Alexander ed. 1998).

20
justify the exercise of government authority in terms that litigants can grasp.55 His
contention depends on judges exercising their authority in a certain manner—they have to
justify their decisions in certain terms—but it does not demand that they decide cases in a
particular way.56 Judges, according to this view, can in some circumstances decide cases
for either party or for opposing reasons so long as their decisions are properly justified.
Macedo’s argument follows a path taken by scholars who tie the justification of
judicial authority to virtues associated with the rule of law. While Macedo associates the
rule of law with public justification and thus the virtue of reasonability, others have
emphasized virtues such as constancy, stability, finality and fairness.57 They contend that
structural characteristics of Courts explain why an institutional system that includes
judicial review will manifest the particular virtue they identify. Their arguments justify
judicial authority based on considerations that do no depend on the outcomes of
particular cases. As with Macedo’s appeal to reasonability, theorists can gauge whether
judicial holdings are predictable, whether constitutional doctrine is stable or whether
judicial holdings resolve controversies with finality, without any preconceived notion of
the correct way to interpret the Constitution. And while the structural emphasis of these
theories lend themselves to claims about the rule of law, we see similar arguments from
people who view the Court from a more political perspective. Terri Peretti, for example,
has claimed that the Judiciary contributes to an institutional structure by expanding the
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range of interests it represents,58 and Barry Friedman believes it provides an outlet for
perspectives that contribute to public dialogue about constitutional values.59
Recall our discussion suggesting that claims like (3) can bear a close relationship
to claims like (2). We saw that it was impossible to know that an institutional structure
promotes integrity without also knowing what it would mean for judges to extend
applicable principles to all cases in which they apply. Although (3) is a structural claim,
it is so closely related to the doctrinal claim in (2) that it is impossible to disentangle one
from the other. (3) seems to depend on a prior understanding of how judges should
interpret the Constitution, in much the same way as Ely’s procedural argument masked
substantive claims. But scholars have defended judicial review based on arguments that
suggest we can sustain the distinction between structural and doctrinal claims, including
some whose claims approach (4) in their distance from the subject of adjudication.
Macedo’s argument, for example, resembles Dworkin’s; Macedo contends that
the judiciary is well suited to perform the reason-giving function, and we must look at
judicial decisions to gauge how well it performs this function. But we can determine that
decisions are reasoned—we do not have to say that they are well reasoned or better
reasoned then potential competitors—while making very few judgments about their
substance. Although we would have to look across opinions to see whether judges give
reasons for their decisions, such analysis does not require the substantive judgments that
would be necessary to determine whether judicial decisions advance Dworkin’s
understanding of integrity or Ely’s understanding of democracy. Similarly, we could

See PERETTI, supra note 50,
Barry Friedman, William Howard Taft Lecture: The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and
Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. University of Cincinnati Law Review 1257, 1291, 129798 (2004).

58

59

22
assess Peretti’s claim that judicial review increases the range of interests our system of
government represents or Barry Friedman’s claim that it promotes political dialogue
without a prior understanding of how to interpret the Constitution.
Nonetheless, we cannot sever completely such assessments from considerations of
constitutional doctrine. We would have to consider whether judges give these reasons in
good faith—whether they actually explain decisions as opposed to only being ex post
justifications of values that judges advance for other reasons. And we cannot assess
Peretti’s and Friedman’s arguments without considering what it would mean to represent
diverse interests or without some ideal of what political discourse should be. These
considerations would no doubt implicate substantive questions about whether certain
decisions are reasoned, advance interests or perspectives that are underrepresented, or
advance an ideal of political discourse.
They do not require judgments as closely related to doctrine as those necessary to
assess Dworkin’s claim of integrity, however. Indeed, some approach (4) in their
distance from the subject of adjudication. Alexander and Schauer, for example, have
argued that a Court empowered with judicial review is well suited to serve as a “single
authoritative interpreter” of the Constitution and thus increases the likelihood of stable
constitutional doctrine.60 The Court, in their view, performs a “settlement function,”
relating to our disagreements as to what the law requires, and in performing this function,
the Court promotes social coordination.61 While it is true that we would assess this
argument by measuring the stability of constitutional doctrine, we would not need to
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assess judicial decisions beyond a determination of how their stability compares to the
decisions made through other institutional arrangements.62

III. Institutional Virtues and the Distinction Between Structural and Doctrinal Claims
This section illustrates how we clarify debates in constitutional theory by
distinguishing the structural and doctrinal aspects of claims like (3). Although
constitutional theorists have relied increasingly on structural claims to justify judicial
review, they are often secondary claims used to support important doctrinal arguments
that remain at the center of debates in constitutional politics. Structural claims tend to be
obscured in the glare of debates about constitutional doctrine and therefore not given
adequate consideration. This problem is exacerbated because of the different aspects of
claims like (3). These claims magnify the doctrinal glare that already distracts our
attention from structural considerations, and in so doing, they draw attention not only
from the structural aspect of their claim but also from other structural claims.
The First Things Symposia attacking judicial activism illustrates these problems.
The Symposiasts attack Supreme Court decisions that they believe undercut the
citizenship of religious people by delegitimizing the moral positions they assert.63 We
will see that that the idea of delegitimization suggests at least two structural claims that
are analogous to (3), but that these claims are obscured by the Symposiasts doctrinal
arguments. We will also see that this problem is magnified by the doctrinal aspect of
these structural claims.
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Finally, the Symposium helps us to identify a tension that arises between
structural arguments that assess the Court’s role in resolving actual controversies—
applying constitutional principles to particular contexts—and structural arguments that
assess the Court’s role in the ongoing process that identifies constitutional values.
Constitutional theorists tend to be more concerned about the Court’s role in identifying
constitutional values, given the extent that debates in constitutional theory have been
framed in terms of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Recall that the failure to identify
principles that could limit judicial discretion leads theorists to justify the discretion
judges have in the process that identifies constitutional values. In identifying virtues that
justify this authority, they treat the authority to resolve controversies as only a step in the
broader process that identifies constitutional values. In so doing, they ignore tension
between the Court’s two roles.

A. Structural Claims Obscured by Doctrinal Claims
The distinction between doctrinal and structural claims is necessary if only to
properly assess structural claims. Consider the First Things Symposia attacking activist
judicial decisions relating to abortion, homosexuality, and the place of religion in society,
decisions that Dworkin would no doubt defend in the name of integrity.64 By comparing
the Symposiasts to Dworkin, we can see that their disagreement is mainly about
constitutional doctrine and substantive justice more generally.
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The Symposiasts contend that the Court’s decisions: (a) introduce great injustice
that undermines the legitimacy of the regime;65 and (b) thwart the will of the people by
substituting the Justices views for those of elected representatives.66 But they have a third
line of attack, one we have already mentioned: that these decisions (c) undercut the
citizenship of religious people by delegitimizing the moral positions they assert.67
While all three claims focus on the substance of the Court’s decisions, the third
claim also suggests a structural argument against judicial review. Their sense of
delegitimization follows because the judicial process need not and, apparently, has not
considered their views—I will sometimes use the term disenfranchisement instead of
delegitimization, in order to emphasize an important implication of the Symposiasts’
argument, that the legislative process is more respectful of citizens’ views.68
But their frustration indicates a deeper problem than a non-accountable institution
making a decision that disrespects a view they hold intensely. After all, there are
political avenues to challenge judicial decisions; the Symposium itself aims to change
constitutional doctrine—to “relegitimize” the views disfavored by the Court. The
problem is that the Court’s exercise of authority creates a presumption in favor of a
certain conception of constitutional values that makes the success of such an act
extremely unlikely.
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The presumption could arise for many reasons. It might follow from how citizens
view the Court. Many citizens seem to accept the Court’s determination of constitutional
values as authoritative, because they believe the Court has special insight into the
Constitution or simply because they are predisposed to respect what they are told are
judgments of law. The presumption might also follow from difficulties in using the
legislative process to promote the views the Court delegitimizes or in navigating the
political process available to challenge judicial interpretations of constitutional values.
The point, however, is not to explain the presumption or even to determine whether it
poses greater difficulties than would arise if a legislature had made similar decisions.
The point is that we might attribute the Symposiasts’ feeling of disenfranchisement to an
institutional structure that creates too great a presumption in favor of values endorsed by
the Court and that such a presumption would not follow if a legislature had made the
same decision. We thus can view the Symposiasts’ third claim as structural.
This structural claim is obscured by the two other arguments whose overriding
concern is to change constitutional doctrine. Moreover, this is a claim that has doctrinal
and structural aspects, and it is not clear that the Symposiasts assign any weight to the
structural aspect of the claim. The Symposiasts might think that because the judiciary is
an elitist institution, it is less likely to represent the interests of religious people. This
would suggest that we remedy the problem by either making judges respect religious
views or, in the alternative, defer to legislatures that do. This interpretation, like (3) that
we associated with Dworkin, assesses the judicial institution in light of its decisions. It
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seems to emphasize the doctrinal aspect of the claim and thus dove-tails nicely with the
Symposiasts’ other arguments.69
Nonetheless, the structural aspect of this claim would survive, even if the Court
were to reverse its decisions on these issues. Although the Symposiasts concerns would
be alleviated by the Court’s reversals, it is not clear that the reversals would signal that
the institution of the judiciary is sufficiently representative. There remains a question of
whether the judiciary, as an institution, is well suited to represent religious views,
whether they are the views of the Symposiasts or of those religious people who embrace
the Supreme Court’s activism and reject the Symposiasts’ criticisms. We should not
allow the Symposiasts’ substantive agenda to interfere with our assessment of this
structural aspect of their claim.
More significantly, the idea of disenfranchisement can be interpreted to reveal a
related structural claim, namely that judicial authority promotes political instability by
giving people the sense that their views will not carry much weight in future deliberations
about what the Constitution means. Disagreements about constitutional values survive
judicial attempts at resolution.70 Given that these disagreements extend in time, we have
an interest in how our institutional structure manages ongoing debates about these values.
The Symposiasts’ expression of disenfranchisement suggests that judges have
created a presumption that makes it harder for religious people to advance their
interpretations of the Constitution in future conflicts. And one would expect a political
69
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community to become less stable, if citizens who dissent from judicial decisions believed
that those decisions would hinder any attempt to advance their views. Consequently,
there is reason to curtail the exercise of judicial authority that increased the likelihood of
people having this sense of disenfranchisement.
The tone of the Symposium certainly suggests that the Symposiasts believe
themselves the victims of such a presumption, and perhaps their anger at the Court’s
decisions draws their attention away from flaws in our constitutional structure. Indeed,
one would expect that the Symposiasts erstwhile allies are better situated to grasp the
problem of instability; they believe that the Symposiasts’ challenge threatens the stability
of our system of constitutional government.71 And if instability arises because our
constitutional structure allows judicial decisions to create an unfair presumption against
certain views, this problem would survive even if the Court were to embrace the
Symposiasts’ position on the contested questions. Judicial decisions that legislatures
must protect fetal life, allow schools to organize prayers and tolerate private
discrimination against homosexuals would place the Symposiasts’ political opponents in
a position similar to their own. Their opponents would have to overcome serious
obstacles in order to use the political process to advance their understanding of
constitutional values, and they would in all likelihood experience the sense of
disenfranchisement expressed by the Symposiasts.
This is not to say that the Symposiasts should embrace the structural claim. We
do not know whether an institutional structure without judicial review will be more stable
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than one that assigns judges this authority. It might be the case that similar presumptions
are created when elected institutions have greater authority to set the status quo meaning
of the Constitution. Moreover, there are other considerations of both institutional design
and substantive justice that will determine whether a political community is stable. And
even if we were endorse the structural claim that an institutional structure without judicial
review is more stable, considerations of substantive justice might lead us to risk the
added instability.
It would be odd, for example, if the Symposiasts would be content with a victory
against judicial activism in a community that would vote overwhelming to support
abortion rights, gay rights, and to exclude religion from the public sphere. One would
hope that everyone can agree that there is a threshold at which procedural justice cannot
justify violations of substantive justice, even if we do not agree where it is. And we
should also be able to agree that structural claims have weight before we cross this
threshold, even if we cannot agree on the weight they should have.
This essay only contends that it is difficult to gauge—or even consider—the
weight of structural claims like those suggested by the Symposiasts, because they are so
closely linked to the doctrinal claims that animate the attack on judicial activism.
Nonetheless, constitutional theorists have long recognized this vice in our constitutional
structure: a Court empowered with judicial review will resolve some issues prematurely
and, in the process, undercut the political position of citizens whose views the Court
disfavors.
The last point bears repeating: the Symposiasts’ structural claim is deeply rooted
in the debates of constitutional theory. Then why would theorists have so much trouble
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assessing whether the structural claim has weight that is independent of the doctrinal
claims with which it is entangled? One reason is that such claims are usually asserted to
support doctrinal claims, and doctrinal claims tend to have greater salience. In those
circumstances where theorists debate constitutional process, questions of substance lurk
in the background much as we saw when we considered the first interpretation of the
Symposiasts’ structural claim.
Consider first how Robert Cover illustrates what he calls the Court’s
“jurispathic”72 function through a critical analysis of Bob Jones.73 The Court, according
to Cover, must favor some understandings of community values over others, when it says
what the law is. In so doing, it kills the understandings not chosen as well as the
community practices that are affiliated with those understandings.74 Consider as well
Bickel’s use of Brown to illustrate the “passive virtues.”75 He believes the Court must
avoid legitimating controversial practices in the name of the Constitution or risk
introducing great instability to the political community.76 The Court’s decision to delay
remedy in Brown II,77 allowed the debate about desegregation to continue without the
Court creating too great a presumption for the interpretation it favored.78 Bickel contrasts
Brown with Plessy,79 where the Court mistakenly legitimated the practice of segregation,
and Scott v. Sanford,80 where it mistakenly legitimated slavery.81
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Now consider two older examples: John Calhoun defends nullification in the
context of a dispute over tariffs and with the broader question of slavery in the immediate
background.82 He believes that this power ensures that a national majority does not
impose a view of the Constitution on a local majority.83 The anti-federalist, Brutus,
makes the same argument from the reverse side when he attacks judicial review, because
the power would ensure that the national majority will determine the meaning of the
Constitution and would be biased toward the expansion of national authority.84 His
argument differs from the others in that it arises in a context in which the debate about
constitutional doctrine is a debate about what process to create. Brutus’s attention to the
nature of judicial power, however, does not appear to go beyond his interest in limiting a
potential leviathan, although the argument is remarkably sensitive to how judicial
authority tends to delegitimate the views of disappointed interests.
We see again that the difficulty in assigning independent weight to structural
claims is magnified by the different ways that considerations of structure intersect with
considerations of doctrine. The first three examples illustrate how structural claims
become linked, and I would argue obscured, by more salient doctrinal claims.
The fourth example reveals how doctrinal considerations will creep into our
consideration of what appears to be a purely structural question; Brutus’ claim is like (3),
though it is not clear the extent it is driven by considerations of doctrine. He suggests
that federal authority will not respond sufficiently to local conceptions of constitutional
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values and thus will be experienced as tyranny at the local level.85 It might be that Brutus
recognizes that federal answers to particular questions of constitutional values will be in
conflict with the local understandings of those values—this is my interpretation of
Calhoun—and this argument is parallel to my interpretation of the Symposiasts’ claim
that looks to the substance of judicial decisions to determine whether religious interests
are well represented.
But Brutus’s can also be interpreted in a manner that gives the structural aspect
somewhat greater emphasis. He might be claiming that the distance of the federal
judiciary from the people of the states ensures such conflicts will arise; although Brutus
might not have particular controversies in mind, he can imagine some conflicts in which
local values should triumph but don’t. In this second case, the procedural claim implies a
substantive understanding in the same way as Ely’s argument that judicial authority is
well structured to promote democratic86 government implied a substantive argument
about the significance of such governments.87 Both interpretations, however, invite
consideration of doctrinal issues, and these issues make it harder to identify the more
purely structural claim, that the judiciary, as an institution, will encourage a sense of
disenfranchisement among some citizens no matter how it decides cases.
It is not surprising that in their criticism of judicial activism the Symposiasts
identify an argument that would attack expansive judicial authority of the type endorsed
by Dworkin. But the structural claim we identified would extend to any justification of
judicial review, including those the Symposiasts might endorse, and that is why it is hard
85
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to grasp the structural aspects of their argument. Indeed, the Symposiasts view judicial
authority from the doctrinal perspective that characterizes Dworkin’s argument. They
seek to advance an understanding of constitutional doctrine that follows from their
particular conception of substantive justice. Therefore, they emphasize claims that are
analogous to (1) and (2), and, like Dworkin, the doctrinal aspect of their third claim
swamps the structural argument.
In the remainder of the section, we examine another consequence of the doctrinal
orientation that characterizes the arguments of the Symposiasts and Dworkin. Given
their focus on the values judges identify, they treat the judiciary’s role in resolving
controversies as a step in the broader political process that identifies community values,
rather than as a distinct role. Therefore, they fail to recognize the tension between the
two roles we expect judges to perform. Their arguments reflect the ascendant paradigm
in constitutional theory, a paradigm in which theorists attempt to assess judicial
discretion in the process that identifies constitutional values. The section concludes by
tracing the tension back to Bickel, in many ways the fountainhead of this paradigm.88

B. The Doctrinal Orientation and the Tension Between Structural Claims
So far, we have seen how the doctrinal aspects of a claim like (3) can obscure its
structural aspects, but we have only considered structural claims relating to the process
that identifies constitutional values. But the structural claims we associated with
Dworkin and the Symposiasts could also be interpreted in a manner that gives greater
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emphasis to the judicary’s role in resolving controversies. Consider again Dworkin’s
claim (3). Integrity seems to be a virtue that characterizes the Court’s resolution of
controversies. A well ordered judicial process would ensure that all citizens receive the
benefit of having the community’s legal principles applied to their cases.
Nonetheless, Dworkin believes that judges do more than resolve controversies
based on pre-existing legal principles. He expects judges to interpret these principles in
light of the considerations of justice that are manifest in the political community’s past
practices, considerations that would not be obvious to the parties or to citizens more
generally.89 Judges, according to Dworkin, should perform a quasi-legislative function;
they are to decide cases in a manner that advances the ideal of justice that underlies the
community’s principles.90 Recall why Dworkin defends an expansive conception of
judicial review. He believes that the judiciary is well suited to advance our deliberations
about the understanding of equality that informs important principles of constitutional
law.91 In so doing, he assumes there is no tension between the Court’s role in resolving
controversies and its role in identifying constitutional values; the Court is well suited to
resolve controversies because it advances our understanding of the values our
constitutional principles entail.
The tension between these roles is implicit in the Symposiasts’ structural claim. It
is not evident in the two interpretations we have previously examined, however, because
those interpretations focus on the process that identifies constitutional values as opposed
to the process that resolves controversies. The Symposiasts, for example, might expect
judges to advance Dworkin’s understanding of justice, but would view this as a reason to
89
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curtail judicial review; they would contend that Dworkin’s understanding does not reflect
the views of religious citizens.92 They might also expect instability to arise from an
institutional structure that excludes the views of religious citizens from the process that
identifies community values.93
But we can interpret the Symposiasts structural claim in light of the role judges
play in resolving particular controversies. Their concern about delegitimization suggests
a third criticism that can be applied to Dworkin’s argument or any argument that justifies
judges having discretionary authority to identify community values. Citizens, according
to this interpretation, are less likely to accept the decisions of judges who they believe to
be hostile to their views, even as those decisions apply to immediate cases. This criticism
differs from the others in that it asks whether the Court is the proper institution to resolve
particular controversies. The Symposiasts do not consider this argument seriously,
because they are concerned about constitutional doctrine.
This orientation leads them, like Dworkin, to collapse the distinction between the
process that resolves controversies and the process that identifies community values, and
thus makes them less likely to consider whether the institution of the judiciary is well
suited to resolve particular controversies. The Symposiasts treat the Court’s decisions as
instances in an ongoing process that identifies constitutional values. They appeal to the
idea that although elected institutions must accept Court authority to resolve particular
cases, these institutions have authority to interpret the Constitution independently as they
exercise their own authority.94 They trace this argument to Abraham’s Lincoln’s

91

See DWORKIN, supra note 7 at 34.
See supra note 65.
93
Id.
94
See Arkes, supra note 69 at 80.
92

36
justification for resisting Dred Scott. According to this view, the Court’s interpretation of
the Constitution is final for the parties but the political debate about what the Constitution
means continues.

95

Although this implies a claim about the authority institutions should

have in identifying constitutional values,96 it is primarily a rhetorical justification that
girds a substantive challenge to the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.
Because the Symposiasts consider the Court’s identification of constitutional
values as part of an ongoing process, they do not examine the tension between the
Court’s role in resolving particular controversies and its role in identifying such values.
Notwithstanding theirstrong views about constitutional doctrine, the Symposiasts’
criticism of the Court has little to do with how disappointed litigants might respond to the
Court and everything to do with how the Court’s decisions influenced subsequent debates
about constitutional values. The claim that the Court disenfranchises certain views would
lose much traction, if we knew that the parties who lost those cases would suffer no
disadvantage in future conflicts about what the Constitution means.
The Symposiasts do not consider the Court a fair arbiter of constitutional
controversies as a consequence of the role it has played in identifying constitutional
values. But they do not examine the ramifications of this judgment, because their
argument treats the resolution of particular controversies as only a step in the process that
identifies constitutional valuesrather than as a distinct process. This tendency is even
more pronounced among the many constitutional theorists who, like Dworkin, defend
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judicial activism and try to guide the Court’s identification of constitutional values.
Because these theorists begin with the assumption that judges will have considerable
discretion in deciding cases, they are even less likely to consider whether the Court’s role
in identifying constitutional values undercuts its ability to resolve controversies.
Consider again Bickel’s justification of judicial review, a model for two
generations of constitutional theorists. He believes that judicial review can be justified,
notwithstanding its counter-majoritarian character, because the Court’s authority is
tempered by other political forces that determine whether the Court is successful in
97
advancing its understanding of constitutional values. Bickel too uses Lincoln’s attack

on Dred Scott to illustrate thatjudicial decisions are one moment in an ongoing political
fight over constitutional values.98 He believes that the efficacy of the Court’s attempts to
say what the Constitution means depends on how elected institutions and citizens, more
generally, respond to the Court’s interpretations of constitutional principles.99 It is this
dependency that leads Bickel to emphasize the importance of the passive virtues.
The Court, according to Bickel, should employ the passive virtues to delay
making final determinations about what the Constitution means until it has had time to
secure the consent of elected institutions and the broader public.
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are various discretionary devices, such as the requirements that a case present a live
controversy, that is ripe, and not a political question.101 Bickel describes them as
techniques and devices that allow the Court to resolve controversies without rendering a
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decision on constitutional grounds and thus do not require the Court to legitimate social
102

practices in the name of the Constitution.

Bickel, as we have seen, is concerned by the instability that results when the
Court prematurely legitimates controversial social practices in the name of the
Constitution,103 and he commends the passive virtues as means to avoid this outcome.104
He also illustrates how the Court can use the passive virtues to suspend the application of
constitutional principles until a later time by which it can convince people that its
understanding of constitutional values is the correct one.105 Bickel recognizes that the
Court brings considerable prestige to the endeavor. He describes the Court’s ability “to
concretize the symbol of the Constitution” and suggests that people are more likely to
embrace political practices the Court deems constitutional—or even not
unconstitutional—because they accept the Court’s authority to speak in the name of the
106

Constitution.

Bickel believes that the Court can perform the function he identifies without being
perceived as an instrument of partisan ideology; the Court can sustain its prestige.107 But
it would seem that the Court’s prestige will diminish as soon as it ventures beyond the
consensus understanding of constitutional values and tries to influence our disagreements
about what the Constitution means. We have already seen how the Court’s prestige and
its position in the institutional structure can create fairly strong presumptions against
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views it rejects. The people who hold these views will feel disenfranchised by the
Court’s actions and resentful towards the Court.
Bickel recognizes this as a problem the Court must face if it is to maintain its
108

position in the process that identifies constitutional values.

He illustrates how the Court

sustained its authority against the significant challenge it faced after the Brown
decision.109 Bickel describes the initial success of the political movement that mobilized
against desegregation and how this movement failed once it was perceived to be engaged
in mob violence rather than passive resistance to the Court.110 People came to embrace
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution and rejected the alternative put forth by its
opponents.

111

Bickel, however, does not address whether the Court’s success affected its

ability to resolve controversies.
The Court became the enemy of those who lost the fight over constitutional
doctrine.112 It seems likely that this had repercussions for judicial efforts to resolve future
controversies, especially those involving the implementation of newly ascendant antidiscrimination norms.113 It would be surprising if this hostility toward the judiciary did
not lead people to resist its authority and thus prolong or exacerbate controversies that
could have been settled more efficiently or peacefully, if judges were not perceived as
interested parties in active pursuit of an ideological agenda.
Moreover, it is likely that judges’ participation in the process that identifies
community values will have subtle effects on the institution of the judiciary, effects that
will influence the Court’s ability to resolve controversies. Justice Scalia, for example,
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has noted that once people recognize the role judges play in the process that identifies
constitutional values, they will demand that the people chosen to be judges will reflect
their views.

114

And we would expect thatcitizens who believe themselves

disenfranchised by an ideological court are more likely to take an interest in future
appointments. Therefore, it is not surprising thatthe Court’s attempts to redefine
constitutional values in Brown and other cases have led to a more politicized nomination
process.115 It would be surprising, however, if an increasingly political appointment
process did not have some influence on how the judiciary, as an institution, views
particular cases.
Scalia, for example, describes a Sixth Amendment case in which the Court makes
an exception to the confrontation clause in order to ensure that the victim of a child
molester was spared the trauma of facing her attacker without increasing the chances of
116

the attacker’s acquittal.

He contends that rights lose their significance, when judges

interpret them in light of political pressure they might experience.117 But we should also
expect that judges appointed to advance longer term doctrinal goals would be less
responsive to the interests of the parties, even if they were to experience no immediate
political pressure.
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Indeed, Bickel’s description of how judges should exercise their authority
illustrates how an ideological Court will be less responsive to the immediate interests of
litigants. Because he views judicial decisions as part of the process that identifies
constitutional values, Bickel does not consider adequately how the Court’s interest in
shaping constitutional doctrine affects its ability to do justice in particular cases. Consider
again the passive virtues. The Court might use the passive virtues to avoid a constitutional
judgment that it believes the society is not ready to endorse. In so doing, it would deny
118

one of the parties a judgment to which they are entitled.

For example, Bickel discusses

the cost to people who suffered harm because the Court did not decide the
119

constitutionality of restrictions that the state of Connecticut placed on birth control.

He

believes that costs such as these are acceptable given the role the Court is to play in
identifying constitutional values, but this seems to beg the question as to whether the
Court should perform a function that is at odds with another important function it
performs.120
Similarly, Bickel’s discussion of Brown does not address the coststhe Court
imposed on a generation of African-Americans by delaying its remedy tothe injustice of
segregation. On the one hand, the Court’s decision in Brown II is a concession to a
political environment in which there was little chance that the South would desegregate its
schools peacefully; justice, in all likelihood, would have been denied even if the Court had
insisted on immediate integration. On the other hand, Bickel recognizes that the Court
could have found the schools in violation of the principle of separate but equal, the law
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prior to Brown.121 In so doing, the Court would have been in a better position to remedy
the violation, whether by insisting that African-American students receive a greater share
of educational resources or perhaps even by requiring desegregation until adequate
facilities were provided.

122

While there would have been resistance to these rulings as well, they would have
at least secured more for the parties, especially if the Justices were perceived as respecting
the values that supported the regime. Perhaps these gains would not have been great, but
the alternative was to subordinate people’s interests to a longer term doctrinal goal.
Bickel does not acknowledge that the Court’s role in identifying constitutional values is in
tension with its role in resolving a particular controversy. Rather than secure plaintiffs
benefits to which they were entitled under the law, the Court pursued a new understanding
of constitutional values that might—or might not—yield gains for similarly situated
people at some undetermined time in the future.

IV. Conclusion
We have seen that structural claims are easily obscured by the doctrinal questions
that often frame debates in constitutional theory. The remainder of this essay considers
how such claims might influence these debates.
To begin, it is worth repeating that our interest in justice must at some point trump
any concern for the institutional structures we use to pursue justice. We would not want
to sever our assessment of judicial authority from any expectation of how judges should
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decide cases. People do not have an obligation to obey governments whose policies fall
below some threshold of justice and would be justified in resisting particular injustices
advanced by such governments. Defining the duties citizens have when their government
pursues policies in tension with important requirements of justice is a problem of political
theory, however.
Constitutional theory addresses a related problem: the best institutional
arrangement for pursuing justice. In considering which arrangements are best, we have
to recognize that these institutions must also manage people’s disagreements about
justice. Structural claims speak to this problem. Our assessment of their significance
will depend both on how we view justice and view our disagreements about justice.
Structural claims should become less important the greater our confidence that
governmental institutions can identify and enforce norms of justice, and scholars with
strong views of what constitutional doctrine should be will likely assign less weight to
these claims. Indeed, we saw that the structural claims made by both Dworkin and the
Symposiasts did little more than complement doctrinal claims that were the core of their
arguments.
Structural claims have greater significance when we believe that government
institutions will not be able to resolve our disagreements about the values that should
govern people’s lives. In such conditions, we have greater interest in how institutions go
about making decisions. We saw, for example, that the fact of disagreement adds weight
to the Symposiasts’ claim that judicial authority disenfranchises certain views. Although
the Symposiasts seem particularly concerned with how disenfranchisement undercuts the
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quest for justice, they also suggest that instability arises when people believe that judges
have created an unfair presumption against such views.
Note well, however, that the essay only contends that constitutional theory is
characterized by a doctrinal orientation that makes it difficult to identify claims of this
type; the essay does not defend the claim or assess its significance. The consideration of
specific structural claims is best saved for another day.123 We will instead consider some
implications that our analysis of structural claims has for debates in constitutional theory
more generally.
The case for expansive judicial authority to identify constitutional values appears
weaker if we seek a process that will manage our disagreements about justice rather than
resolve them. The legislative process tends to be better suited to respect disagreement.124
Legislatures typically have incentives to define policies that accommodate diverse
interests. The American legislative system, with its abundance of minority vetoes, is
particularly well suited to represent minority views and thus ensure that any significant
piece of legislation has super-majority support. The judiciary, by contrast, is designed to
increase the chances that judges will decide cases correctly. Because judges have to
decide for one party or the other—they have less opportunity than legislators do to
123
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compromise and accommodate—there is a greater urgency for good decisions. And the
design of the judiciary reflects this need.
Judges are given independence to isolate them from political pressures. They
tend to be highly educated and apply their training to evidence that is revealed through a
process that has been finely calibrated to increase the chances of a correct decision. It is
not surprising then, that many arguments for expansive judicial authority have
emphasized how the judiciary is well suited to identify important constitutional values
that the legislative process often ignores. People, who believe that they have special
insight into justice or particular confidence in the understanding of justice that they hold,
are more likely to have faith in an elite judiciary, a judiciary that may one day be
populated by judges like themselves.
On the other hand, the judiciary’s exalted status can become a vice in a
community characterized by deep disagreements about justice. In such a community,
partisan elites would seek to control judges in order to gain a presumption favoring their
particular interpretation of the Constitution, and, in so doing, they would inflame the
controversies that manifest the underlying disagreements about justice. Consequently,
we would have reason to favor the stability achieved by an institutional structure that is
more likely to leave unresolved divisive questions of constitutional interpretation,
But we cannot manage our disagreements without resolving the particular
controversies that implicate broader questions of justice, and we expect that judges often
will resolve these controversies. That is why (a) the judicial process is designed to
maximize the likelihood of good decisions and (b) judges have less flexibility to
compromise and accommodate. In addition, some of the virtues that scholars claim
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support the authority of judicial review lend themselves to the function of resolving short
term controversies. Consider again Dworkin’s claim about integrity or Macedo’s about
reasonability. Judges promote social stability when their decisions resolve controversies
with finality, and citizens more readily can accept the authority of decisions that are well
reasoned and that treat like cases alike. I suspect that scholars in search of a justification
for expanding judicial power have assumed that the qualities that make judges good at
resolving particular controversies can be applied to our broader disagreements about
justice. We have seen, however, that expanding such authority risks changing the
institution in ways that will render it less adept at resolving those controversies.
Lastly, structural claims should influence how we approach questions of judicial
authority, even if they do not lend themselves to the particular conclusions discussed
above. Constitutional theorists are too readily drawn into doctrinal battles of
constitutional politics.125 Our scholarly resources are spent declaring and justifying
landmark decisions, rather than examining the consequences of competing institutional
structures.
More significantly, most constitutional theorists have training in law or political
science, training that lends itself to questions of how institutions operate and the effects
institutions have rather than to speculations about justice. And though scholars have paid
increasing attention to the effects of different institutional structures, they have tended to
treat institutions as independent variables that might explain the dependent variable,
constitutional doctrine. They have paid comparatively little attention to the role these
institutions might play in managing society’s disagreements. This deficiency becomes
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especially troubling, if our disagreements about justice run so deep as to survive any
political settlement.
What is more, constitutional theory might very well advance a discussion of how
to go about addressing disagreements about justice, even though the disagreements
themselves are beyond its effective resolution. It might be possible to build a scholarly
consensus about questions of constitutional structure, because such questions are at least
one step removed from the substantive disagreements that animate political controversies.
Dworkin, for example, will more likely accept the claim that the judicial institution
creates presumptions prematurely than he will the claim that judges should not guarantee
women’s right to choose to have an abortion.
Even if we cannot agree on the constitutional structure that best addresses our
disagreements about justice, it is quite possible to achieve a consensus about the likely
consequences that follow from using certain institutional structures to resolve these
disagreements. The Symposiasts will continue to recognize that judicial review creates an
undue presumption in favor of certain views, even if the Court were to reverse the
decisions that they believe have disenfranchised religious views. And in the event of a
rebirth of conservative activism, Dworkin would as well. In such a case, Dworkin and
the Symposiasts would disagree about the justice of the new decisions. They might agree
about the role the Court should play in identifying constitutional values, even though
their disagreements about justice or other structural considerations will weigh against
their meeting of the minds. They would agree, however, that a Court empowered with
judicial review is prone to create too great a presumption against certain understandings
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of constitutional values. At a minimum, structural claims allow us to better understand
the depth and subtleties of our disagreements.

